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EMPLOYMENT

LAW -

FEDERAL EMPLOYERS'

LiABmrrY ACT -

The

Supreme Court held that an employee who suffered prolonged
asbestos exposure could not recover under FELA for negligently
inflicted emotional distress unless, and until, the employee had
manifested physical symptoms of disease.
Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 117 S. Ct. 2113 (1997,).
In 1985, Michael Buckley, ("Buckley"), began working as a
pipe-fitter for Metro-North
Commuter Railroad Company,
("Metro-North").' Buckley repaired and maintained the pipes in the
steam tunnels of the Grand Central Terminal in New York City.2
Prior to performing any maintenance or repair on the pipes,
Buckley and the other pipe-fitters had to remove a white insulation
material covering the pipes.3 As Buckley and his co-workers
removed the insulation, it often broke into pieces, releasing dust
particles into the air.4 Throughout the day, the dust covered
Buckley's skin and clothes and entered his nose and mouth.5
Unbeknownst to Buckley, the insulation material contained
asbestos, a substance widely recognized as a carcinogen since the
1970's. 6 Over a three-year period, from June 1985 to June 1988,
Buckley was exposed to the asbestos-laden dust on an average of
one hour per working day.7 Metro-North admitted it knew of the
asbestos problem, but not until August 31, 1987 did Metro-North
require the pipe-fitters to attend an asbestos awareness class, more
than two years after Buckley's exposure began.8 During this class,
Buckley first learned that the insulation that he had been working
with for several years contained asbestos. 9 The pipe-fitters reported
1. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 117 S.Ct. 2113, 2116 (1997).
2. Buckley, 117 S.Ct. at 2125 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
3. Id.
4. Id.

5. Id. The pipe-fitters were known as the "snowmen of Grand Central" because their
bodies were completely covered with the white dust at the end of their working day. Id.
6. Id.

7. Buckley, 117 S. Ct. at 2125 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 2116. Metro-North made the classes a requirement only after it received
numerous asbestos-related citations stemming from a September 1986 fire in Grand Central
Terminal. Buckley v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 79 E3d 1337, 1340 (2d Cir. 1996).
9. Buckley, 79 F3d at 1340. During these classes, Buckley was told that asbestos can
cause several debilitating and deadly diseases such as asbestosis and lung cancer and was
shown several videotapes which displayed people suffering from these diseases. Id. Buckley
also received instruction on how to safely remove the asbestos and was issued a half-face
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back to work and began using the removal techniques taught in the
class and safety apparatus Metro-North issued them. 10 However,
because the precautions seemed futile in preventing asbestos
exposure, the pipe-fitters confronted Metro-North concerning the
issue of safety, but Metro-North dismissed their complaints." The
workers contacted the Attorney General for the State of New
York.' 2 Buckley, joined by 140 other pipe-fitters, initiated a civil suit
3
against Metro-North.
On the advice of his attorney, Buckley received a medical
evaluation, during which his doctors concluded that due to his
asbestos exposure, Buckley suffered an increased risk of death
from cancer or another asbestos-related disease. 4 After learning of
his lengthy exposure and increased risks of disease, Buckley
became extremely fearful of developing cancer.'5 Because of this
fear, Buckley underwent periodic medical checkups for cancer and
reveal
asbestosis after 1989.16 These checkups, however, did not
7
disease.
asbestos-related
other
any
or
cancer
any signs of
Buckley sued Metro-North under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act, ("FELA"),' 5 seeking damages for negligently inflicted emotional
distress and future medical checkups. 19 The United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York granted Metro-North's.
respirator. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1341. The workers were concerned because the respirators fit poorly and the
plastic gloves they were issued melted on the pipes after the insulation was removed. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. The pipe-fitters contacted the firm because they wanted Metro-North to be held
accountable for their actions. Id. Buckley's case was organized as a test case for the claims
of all the pipe-fitters. Id.
14. Buckley, 79 F3d at 1341. The two doctors who evaluated Buckley testified that
even after accounting for the effects of his now discarded 15-year smoking habit, Buckley's
exposure to the extremely high levels of asbestos on the job created a significant added risk
of death due to cancer. Id. One doctor testified to a 1-5% increase in risk while the other
testified to a 1-3% increase. Id. The doctors explained that while Buckley had no present
symptoms of disease, the latency period for any of the asbestos-related diseases is more than
ten years and periodic medical check-ups would greatly increase the chances of early
detection and immediate treatment. Id.
15. Id. Buckley was extremely angry with Metro-North and no longer trusted his
employer to provide a safe workplace. Id. As a result of the exposure, Buckley was highly
concerned about developing an asbestos-related disease in his future, no longer had peace of
mind, andbecame very stressed and overprotective of his son. Id.
16. Buckley, 117 S. Ct. at 2116.
17. Id.
18. 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 (1908). This statute holds the railroad "liable in damages" to any
employee "suffering injury... from the negligence" of the railroad. Id.
19. Buckley, 117 S. Ct. at 2116.
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motion for judgment as a matter of law.20 The district court
concluded that Buckley had not satisfied the "zone of danger" test
that would warrant a finding of negligent infliction of emotional
distress under FELA. 21 Under the "zone of danger" test, recovery
for emotional injury is limited to those plaintiffs who sustain a
physical impact as a result of a defendant's negligent conduct, or
who are placed in immediate risk of physical harm by that
conduct. 22 The court determined that Buckley had not suffered a
sufficient impact from asbestos to satisfy the "zone of danger"
test.2 In addition, the court concluded that even if Buckley had
satisfied the "zone of danger" test, he had not offered any objective
24
evidence to allow a jury to find he suffered real emotional inUjry.
The district court did not address Buckley's claim for the costs of
medical monitoring in its judgment as a matter of law in favor of
Metro-North.

25

Buckley appealed the district court's decision to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which vacated the
judgment and remanded the case to the district court for a jury
trial.26 The Second Circuit determined that Buckley did suffer a

physical impact from asbestos that would lead a reasonable person
to fear asbestos-related cancer.27 The court dismissed Metro-North's
20. Buckley, 79 F.3d at 1342. "Judgment as a matter of law" may be entered against a
party if the "party has been fully heard on the issue and there is no legally sufficient
evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue." FED. R. Civ. P.
50(a)(1).
21. Buckley, 117 S. Ct. at 2116. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532
(1994) (holding that the common-law zone of danger test determines who may recover for
negligent infliction of emotional distress in FELA cases).
22. Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 547.
23. Buckley, 79 F3d at 1343. The district court found that Buckley had not sustained
any immediate physical injury and did not present sufficient evidence to prove that he
inhaled enough asbestos to create a reasonable fear of developing any asbestos-related
disease, either of which is necessary to prove the genuineness of the claim. Id. The court,
relying on expert testimony, concluded that the determination of 'an individual's actual
exposure to asbestos is riddled with difficulty because it depends upon uncertainties of
actual exposure time and individual sensitivity. Id.
24. Id. The court concluded that Buckley had not displayed the level of concern which
would be necessary to sustain a claim for emotional injury Id. They pointed out that he
continued to work for Metro-North in the tunnels after learning of the asbestos exposure
even after being given the option of transferring to a asbestos-free facility, that he continued
to smoke, and that he did not show signs of worry to the doctors when he was examined.
Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. The court found ample evidence that asbestos dust covered Buckley's skin,
entering his nose, eyes, and mouth. Id. When this evidence is viewed in the light most
favorable to Buckley, the evidence indicates that he suffered a massive exposure to asbestos.
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argument that Buckley's exposure did not constitute a physical
impact unless clinical symptoms of an asbestos-related disease
developed. 28 Also, the court found sufficient objective evidence of
Buckley's expression of worry to permit the district court judge to
send Buckley's claim to the jury.29 Finally, the court concluded that
a plaintiff may recover reasonable medical expenses as a result of
an injury and that, although Buckley had not yet exhibited
asbestos-related disease, the costs of monitoring the effects of his
30
asbestos exposure were reasonable and necessary expenditures.
The Supreme Court of the United States granted Metro-North's
petition for certiorari.3 1 The Court reversed the judgment of the
Second Circuit, holding that Buckley could not recover damages for
negligent infliction of emotional distress until he manifested
symptoms of an asbestos-related disease nor could he recover the
32
cost of future medical monitoring.
In an opinion delivered by Justice Breyer, the majority
recognized that the critical issue was whether the physical contact
with the insulation dust amounted to a "physical impact," as the
Court in GottshaU used that term. 3 The Court determined the
contact with the dust was not a physical impact that would permit
recovery for emotional distress under FELA.34 In reaching this
conclusion, the majority determined that the phrase "physical
impact" does not encompass an exposure to a substance that poses
Id.
28. Buckley, 79 F.3d at 1343. The court refused to dismiss the claim as not genuine just
because Buckley's injuries are subcellular. The panel concluded that understanding the effect
of asbestos is difficult, but with the help of expert testimony, a reasonable jury could find
that Buckley suffered a physical impact from asbestos despite the absence of clinical
symptoms. Id. at 1344.
29. Buckley, 117 S. Ct. at 2116. Buckley had made several workplace complaints to his
supervisors and other investigative entities. Id.
30. Buckley, 79 F3d at 1347. The court concluded that the basic law of damages
allowed a plaintiff to recover past and future medical expenses incurred as a result of an
injury. Id. In this case, the evidence demonstrates that Buckley's risk of developing a disease
increased significantly and future medical monitoring would be of immense value in
detecting early signs or symptoms. Id.
31. Id. A "writ of certiorari" is an order issued by a higher court to a lower court
requiring the production of the certified record of a particular case. The higher court will
inspect the record and determine whether there were any irregularities. BLACK'S LAW
DIcTIoNARY 1109 (6th ed. 1990).
32. Buckley, 117 S. Ct. at 2120-21.
33. Id. at 2116. Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas joined in
Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion. Id. at 2115. Justice Ginsburg filed an opinion concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Justice Stevens joined. Id. at 2124"
(Ginsburg, J,. concurring).
34. Id. at 2117.
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a future risk of disease, but is limited to instances where a
threatened physical contact caused, or might have caused,
immediate traumatic bodily harm.3 5 The Court then considered
common-law precedent and determined that most common law
emotional
courts have denied frecovery for negligently caused
36
free.
symptom
and
disease
are
who
distress to those
The Court also decided that the public policy concerning
harm demands a narrow definition of
recovery for emotional
"physical impact."37 This interpretation of "physical impact" led the
Court to conclude that Buckley had not suffered a physical impact
because he had not suffered any threat of physical contact that
caused, or could have caused, immediate physical harm.38
The majority then examined Buckley's claim for medical
monitoring costs. 39 In concluding that Buckley could not recover
these costs, the Court reasoned that damages cannot be awarded in
the absence of injury.40 The Court surmised that the Second Circuit
may have based its decision on the broader ground that medical
monitoring costs represent a separate economic injury for which a
plaintiff may recover under FELA. 41 Nevertheless, the Court
dismissed the Second Circuit's analysis, finding that it extended
beyond the boundaries of evolving common law on the issue of
recovery of lump sum damages.4
Justice Ginsburg concurred in part and dissented in part with the
majority's view.43 She believed Buckley's contact with asbestos did
constitute a "physical impact," 44 but determined that his claim for
35. Id. at 2118.
36. Id.
37. Buckley, 117 S. Ct. at 2118. These reasons include: (1) difficulty for judges to
distinguish valid from invalid claims; (2) a threat of unlimited liability; and (3) the potential
for a deluge of trivial claims. Id. at 2119.
38. Id. at 2121.
39. Id.
40. Id. While the Court recognized that damages could be awarded for a recognizable
injury, it ruled against awarding damages because it found that Buckley had not suffered a
physical impact that would allow him to recover for emotional distress under FELL Id.
41. Id. Under tort theory, a successful plaintiff may be permitted a lump-sum recovery
of medical costs. Id.
42. Buckley, 117 S. Ct. at 2124. The Court found those cases permitting "recovery for
medical monitoring in the absence of physical injury do not endorse a full-blown, traditional
tort law cause of action for lump-sum damages." Id. at 2122.
43. Id. at 2124 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Stevens joined in Justice Ginsburg's
concurrence. Id.
44. Id. Justice Ginsburg found that Buckley's extensive contact with the asbestos on
the job constituted "physical impact" as that term was used in Consolidated R.R. v.
Gottshal. Id.
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emotional distress should fail because he did not present sufficient
evidence of severe emotional distress.45 Justice Ginsburg, however,
would not have disturbed the Second Circuit's ruling that allowed
recovery for the cost of medical monitoring. 46
In the dissenting portion of her opinion, Justice Ginsburg
reasoned that recognition of such a claim for medical monitoring
47
costs would place FELA in agreement with evolving common law.
Justice Ginsberg concluded that the Court undervalued several
state court decisions upholding recovery for medical monitoring
costs.4 8 She found the majority's anticipation of a flood of unlimited
liability groundless, 49 concluding that withholding relief is a grave
decision because, without monitoring, diagnosis may come too late
to save many people. ° Finally, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that
although the Court reversed Buckley's claim for relief, it remanded
the case for further proceedings. 51 By this ruling, the Court
proposed, in Justice Ginsburg's view, Buckley could replead his
claim and recover medical monitoring costs in a form other than a
lump sum.5 2 Justice Ginsburg concluded that the Court should have
found that a claim for medical monitoring is allowable under
53
FELA.
For nearly ninety years, FELA has governed the compensation
claims of railroad workers injured on the job.M Congress enacted
FELA to protect against dangerous conditions by holding a railroad
45. Id. Justice Ginsburg made this conclusion based on the fact that Buckley did not
seek any professional help to ease his mental distress and presented no medical testimony
concerning his mental health. Id. at 2125 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 2125 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
47. Buckley, 117 S. Ct. at 2126 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg pointed out
that this type of medical monitoring action has been increasingly recognized by state courts
as essential given the latent nature of the diseases caused by exposure to asbestos and other
hazardous materials. Id.
48. Id. at 2127 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The Third Circuit recognized a right of
compensation for monitoring the warning signs of disease and elaborated on the elements of
a compensable medical monitoring claim. In re Paoli R. Yard PCB Litigation, 916 F.2d 829,
851 (3d Cir. 1990).
49. Id. at 2128 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg expressed doubt that many
individuals will ever be able to prove that their employer negligently exposed them to a
hazardous substance that substantially increased their risk of developing a deadly disease.
Id.
50. Id. at 2129 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 2130 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg believed that this leaves
open whether Buckley may state a claim for relief for medical monitoring under FELA. Id.
52. Buckley, 117 S. Ct. at 2130 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
53. Id. The dissent reasoned that allowing this type of recovery will place the Court in
sync with evolving common law. Id.
54. 45 U.S.C.A. § 51-61 (1908).

1998

Metro-North

liable for the "legs, eyes, arms, and lives that it consumed in its
operations." 55 This act, however, did not make the employer an
insurer; liability under FELA was predicated upon employer
negligence.5 The statute holds railroads liable for any injuries that
an employee may incur as a result of the railroad's negligence.
67While the statute appeared to do no more than perpetuate the
common law right to recover for negligence, FELA deprived
employers of the traditional tort defenses that often barred
employees' recovery.5 The statute eliminated the fellow-servant
rule,5 9 replaced contributory negligence with comparative
negligence, ° and prohibited employers from exemption by
contract. 61 Congress later amended FELA to eliminate the defense
of assumption of the risk.62 Consequently, injured railroad
employees found it much easier to recover for employer
negligence.6
Although FELA was a major step forward in employee safety,
injured employees still had the difficult and often impossible task
of proving the negligence of their employers.64 The Supreme Court
recognized this difficulty, liberally construing FELA during the last
55. See Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 68 (1949) (Douglas, J., concurring). The
purpose of the statute was to "lift from the employees the 'prodigious burden' of personal
injuries which that system had placed upon them, and to relieve men 'who by the exigencies
and necessities of life are bound to labor' from the risks and hazards that could be avoided
or lessened 'by the exercise of proper care on the part of the employer in providing safe and
proper machinery and equipment with which the employee does his work'." Id.
56. Id.
57. 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 (1908). The statute provides that " {CO}07}(07)e]very common
carrier by railroad... shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is
employed by such carrier... for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the
negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier." Id.
58. 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 51, 53, 55 (1908); 45 U.S.C.A. § 54 (1939).
59. 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 (1908). The employer is liable for the negligence of its "officers,
agents, or employees." Id.
60. 45 U.S.C.A. § 53 (1908). In any action by a railroad employee against his employer
to recover damages for injuries, "the fact that the employee may have been guilty of
contributory negligence shall not bar recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by the
jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employee." Id.
61. 45 U.S.C.A. § 55 (1908). "Any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the
purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself from
liability created by this chapter, shall be to that extent void." Id.
62. 45 U.S.C.A. § 54 (1939). "In any action brought against any common carrier [under
FELA]... such employee shall not be held to have assumed the risks of his employment in
any case where such injury resulted in whole or in part from the negligence . . . of such
carrier." Id.
63. Wilkerson, 336 U.S. at 68.
64. 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 (1908).

1000

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 36:993

fifty years to further Congress' remedial goals.6 In doing so, the
Court has consistently held that negligence under FELA differs
considerably from pure common law negligence.6 One of the
earliest cases in which the Supreme Court deviated from common
law principles was Urie v. Thompson.6 7 In Urie, a railroad worker
developed silicosis through inhaling silica dust that had blown into
the cabs of the locomotives in which he worked.68 The employee
sued under FELA, alleging that the railroad negligently failed to
maintain sanders on the locomotives, thereby allowing excessive
amounts of silica dust to penetrate the cabs.6 The Court examined
two questions: whether the petitioner had stated a claim for
negligence under FELA, and whether the coverage of FELA
included occupational diseases in addition to accidents. 70
The Urie majority recognized that FELA was founded on the
common law concepts of negligence and injury "as established and
applied in the federal courts."71 Negligence under FELA is a federal
question because a standard definition of negligence is required,
not a definition that varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 72 Using
this analysis, the Court rejected the railroad's defense of
compliance with industry standards, holding that. a railroad is liable
for negligence under FELA if it knew or should have known that
the customary safety precautions were insufficient to protect an
employee. 73
The majority then turned to whether silicosis was an "injury"
65. Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 543.
66. Id. Courts have consistently concluded that negligence under FELA is subject to a
more relaxed standard. Id.
67. 337 U.S. 163 (1949). Justice Rutledge delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice
Frankfurter filed an opinion concurring in the judgement in part and dissenting in part in
which Justices Reed, Jackson, and Burton joined.
68. Urie, 337 U.S. at 165. "Silicosis" is a permanently disabling pulmonary disease
caused by long-term continuous inhalation of silica dust. Id.
69. Id. The railroad uses a sand material consisting of 80-9096 silica or silicon dioxide
to provide traction for the locomotive wheels. However, the sanders (the apparatus that
stores and deposits the traction material on the rails) were out of adjustment allowing
excessive amounts of this sand material to be emitted, thereby causing high amounts of
silica dust to be sucked into the locomotive cabs. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 174.
72. Id. Because FELA is a federal statute and does not define the term negligence,
federal law formulating and applying the concept governs. Id.
73. Urie, 337 U.S. at 178. The court Stated that "negligence, within the meaning of
FELA, attached if [the railroad] 'knew, or by the exercise of due care should have known,'
that prevalent standards of conduct were inadequate to protect. . . employees." Id.
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under FELA. 74 The Court rejected the railroad's suggestion that the
5
common law does not recognize occupational diseases,7
concluding that a restriction of the term "injury" would be contrary
to the statute's plain meaning. 76 The Court held that FELA should
77
be liberally construed to accomplish its humanitarian purposes.
The Court's decision broadened the term "injury" beyond a harm
suffered by external, violent, and accidental means to any
impairment of health that an employer's negligence over an
extended period of time may cause. 78 Justice Rutledge explained
that one type of injury should not be excluded from FELA coverage
simply because it takes longer for its harmful and crippling effects
to become apparent.7 9
In Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co.,s° the Court made another
step in furtherance of Congress' remedial goals through liberal
interpretation of FELA.81 In Rogers, the issue was whether the
Missouri Supreme Court failed to apply the appropriate concept of
causation under FELA, thereby invading the proper function of the
jury.82 The plaintiff was an employee of the railroad who was
assigned to burn off the vegetation that grew on either side of the
tracks s3 According to company rules, if Rogers heard a train
coming, he was to stop burning and move away from the tracks.s4
On the day in question, Rogers . moved off the tracks, but as the
train went by, it fanned the flames of the burning weeds,
enveloping Rogers in smoke and flames. s5 As Rogers tried to retreat
74.

Id. at 180.

75. Id. at 182. The Court concluded, "at common law, the incurring of a disease or
harm to health warrants a recovery if the other elements of liability for the tort are present."
Id.
76. Id. at 182.
77. Id. at 180-81. The Court held that "to read into the statute a restriction as to the
kind of employees covered, the degree of negligence required, or the particular sorts of
harms inflicted, would be contradictory to the wording, the remedial and humanitarian
purpose, and constant and established course of liberal construction of the Act." Id.
78. Urie, 337 U.S. at 187. The Court concluded that silicosis is as much an injury under
FELA, which in time leads to permanent disability, as an injury which produces instant
consequences. Id.
79.

Id.

80. 352 U.S. 500 (1957). Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court in which
Justice Burton concurred. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan each filed dissenting opinions.
81. Rogers, 352 U.S. at 502.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. While the train passed, Rogers was required to inspect it and report any
problems in his journal. Id.
85. Rogers, 352 U.S. at 502.
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from the flames, he slipped on gravel, fell down the slope, and was
86
injured.
The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed a decision in favor of
Rogers, reasoning that Rogers' inattention to the fire was the direct
cause of his injuries, not any negligence by the railroad. 87 The
Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding that under
FELA, the test is whether the evidence shows that employer
negligence played even the slightest part in producing the
employee's injury or death.88 The majority determined that ample
evidence existed to support a jury finding for Rogers because the
railroad should have been aware that a passing train could fan the
flames and create a condition in which Rogers, while performing
duties required of him, would be subject to such an injury.89 The
Court's holding established a relaxed standard of causation under
FELA, requiring a judge to submit questions of negligence to the
jury if the conclusion could be drawn that the employer's
negligence contributed even slightly to the injury of the employee. 90
The Court's trend of liberal interpretation and application of
FELA continued in Kernan v. American Dredging Co.91 In Kernan,
a seaman lost his life in a fire caused by an open-flame kerosene
lantern hung in violation of a Coast Guard navigation rule. 92 A
wrongful death action was commenced pursuant to the Jones Act.
93The district court held that no "negligence per se" existed because
the Coast Guard intended the regulation to prevent collisions, not
94
fires.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 504. The Supreme Court of Missouri stated that the emergency that caused
plaintiff's injury was brought on by himself, i.e.,
that plaintiff's inattention to the fire was
"something extraordinary, unrelated to, and disconnected" from any negligence on the part
of the railroad. Id.
88. Id. at 506. The Court stated that it is of no consequence whether the jury may also
attribute the result to other causes, including the employee's contributory negligence. Id.
89. Id. at 503.
90. Rogers, 352 U.S. at 508. The employee's burden is met and the employer must
compensate for damages when there is proof, even though completely circumstantial, from
which the jury may with reason make an inference that the employer's negligence played any
part in the injury. Id.
91. 355 U.S. 426 (1958) Justice Brennan wrote the opinion of the court. Justice Harlan
filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Frankfurter, Burton, and Whittaker joined.
92. Kernan, 355 U.S. at 427. The rule promulgated by the Coast Guard required that
kerosene lamps be hung no lower than eight feet above the water. Id. In this case, the lamp
was hung approximately three feet above the water. Id.
93. Id. at 429. The Jones Act created a federal cause of action for the wrongful death
of a seaman based on the principles of FELA. Id.
94. Id. at 428. "Negligence per se" is a form of ordinary negligence that results from a
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The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's common law
"negligence per se" argument by concluding that violation of a
statute creates liability under FELA, even if the injury is one that
the statute was not designed to prevent.9 5 The Court held that the
violation of a statutory duty under FELA creates liability if the
defect or insufficiency in equipment "contributes to the death or
injury, without regard to whether the injury was one the statute
sought to prevent."96 In redefining "negligence per se" in FELA
claims, the Court concluded that Congress did not intend to create
a fixed and unchanging remedy, but one that would develop and
evolve to meet ever-changing conditions and concepts of industry's
duty toward its employees.97
The Court advanced the departure from common law negligence
principles again only a few months later in Sinkler v. Missouri
Pacific R.R. Co. 98 In Sinkler, the Court interpreted the meaning of
the term "agent" under FELA. 99 Parris Sinkler, a railroad employee,
was injured when the car in which he was riding collided with
another car after it was negligently switched. 100 The district court
held that the defendant railroad could not be held liable for
Sinkler's injuries because the switching crew responsible for the
accident was an "independent contractor," not an "agent" of the
railroad, under FELA. 1°1 In reversing the lower court's decision, the
Supreme Court held that an accommodation must be given to the
word "agents," concluding that when a railroad employee is injured
by the fault of others performing the normal activities of his
violation of a statute or a municipal ordinance. BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 719 (6th ed. 1990).
The conduct is treated as negligence without proof of the particular surrounding
circumstances. Id.
95. Id. at 433.
96. Id. The Court concluded that liability ensues whether the employer's fault is a
violation of a statutory duty or the broader duty of care because the employer owes just as
much care when complying with a statutory obligation as when acting with the general duty
of care. Id. at 440.
97. Kernan, 355 U.S. at 432.
98. 356 U.S. 326 (1958). Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice
Whittaker concurred in the opinion. Justice Harlan filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Justice Frankfurter joined.
99. Sinkler, 356 U.S. at 328. The statute provides that "[elvery common carrier by
railroad ... shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed
by such carrier... for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence
of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier." 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 (1908).
100. Id. at 326. The switching crew caused the collision with another car in the train
yard by switching the car onto the wrong track. Id.
101. Id. at 328. The switching crew was employed by Houston Belt & Terminal Railway
Company and not the defendant, Missouri Pacific R.R. Id. at 326.
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employer under contract, such others are considered "agents"
under FELA 0 2
Although these cases demonstrate the liberal evolution of FELA
jurisprudence in the Supreme Court, the issue in Metro-North v.
Buckley (whether negligent infliction of emotional distress is
cognizable under FELA) was not considered until 1987 in Atchison,
Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell.103 In Buell, a car-man
employed by the railroad suffered severe emotional injuries as a
result of harassment and intimidation that the railroad condoned
and approved. 1' 4 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not decide
in Buell whether purely emotional injuries are cognizable under
FELA because the Court found the trial court record insufficiently
developed. 105 In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated that the
issue "is not necessarily an abstract point of law or a pure question
of statutory construction that might be answerable without
exacting scrutiny of the facts of the case." 06 The Court concluded
that the answer depended on many factors, including the extent of
07
injury and nature of the injury-causing activity.
Seven years later, in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall,08 the
Court again addressed whether negligent infliction of emotional
distress is compensable under FELA. 109 In Gottshall, the plaintiff
sued Conrail under FELA for negligent infliction of emotional
distress after suffering major depression and post-traumatic stress
disorder. 10 Gottshall was part of a work crew assigned to replace a
length of defective track on an extremely hot day."' Because the
102. Id. at 329, 331. The Court acknowledged that FELA was an avowed departure
from the rules of the common law and that its purpose was to promote "the welfare of both
employer and employee, by adjusting the losses and injuries inseparable from industry and
commerce to the strength of those who in the nature of the case ought to share the burden."
Id. at 330 (citing S. Rep. No. 60-460, at 3 (1908)).
103. 480 U.S. 557 (1987). Justice Stevens delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
104. Buel, 480 U.S. at 559.
105. Id. at 564. Although the issue was not raised by either party in the district court,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit raised the issue of whether
emotional injuries were compensable under FELA. The Supreme Court found the facts were
insufficient for either the Ninth Circuit or the Supreme Court to decide this issue. Id.
106. Id. at 568.
107. Id.
108. 512 U.S. 532 (1994). Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter joined. Justice
Souter filed a concurring opinion. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion in which
Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined.
109. Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 535.
110. Id. at 537.
111. Id. at 535.
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crew was behind in its work, the foreman discouraged the men
from taking frequent breaks." 2 One worker, who was a longtime
friend of Gottshall's, collapsed, turned pale, and began sweating
profusely. 13 The other workmen ran to his assistance and
administered cold compresses, but after they revived him, the crew
4
supervisor ordered the men to stop assisting and return to work."
Shortly thereafter, Gottshall saw his friend stand up and collapse
again."15 Recognizing that his friend was having a heart attack,
Gottshall began cardiopulmonary resuscitation." 6 The supervisor
then attempted to call for help, but found his radio inoperative
because Conrail had temporarily taken the nearest base station off
the air.1 7 By the time help arrived, the victim had died." 8 They
covered the body and the foreman ordered the men back to work
until the coroner arrived several hours later." 9 Shortly after the
funeral of his friend, Gottshall was admitted to a psychiatric
institution and diagnosed with major depression and post-traumatic
stress disorder. 20
In his complaint, Gottshall alleged Conrail's negligence created
the conditions that caused him to witness and participate in the
events surrounding his friend's death. 12' Relying on the analysis and
conclusions of its prior FELA decisions, the Court turned to the
common law to consider the right of recovery for emotional
distress.' 22 The majority determined that although common-law
principles are not conclusive in determining FELA recovery, courts
accord them considerable weight unless FELA expressly rejects
such principles. 23 FELA does not address the issue of negligent
112. Id. at 536.
113. Id.
114. Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 536. The crew supervisor initially did nothing to assist the
collapsed worker. Id.
115. Id. at 536.
116. Id.
117. Id. The base station was taken off the air for repairs; however, the crew
supervisor had no knowledge that this was the case and was not provided with alternative
means of communicating in case of an emergency. Id.
118. Id. After failing to raise anyone on the radio, the crew supervisor drove off to get
help from paramedics. Id.
119. GottshaU, 512 U.S. at 536.
120. Id. Gottshall experienced nausea, insomnia, cold sweats, and repetitive nightmares
concerning the death. Id. He lost a great deal of weight and suffered from suicidal
tendencies and anxiety. Id. at 537.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. The Court concluded that only to the extent of explicit statutory alterations is
FELA a departure from the rules of common law. Id.
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infliction of emotional distress and, therefore, common-law
principles play a significant part in a court's decision. 1 4 The Court
determined that many states already acknowledged a right to
recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress when Congress
enacted FELA in 1908.125 Moreover, the Court looked to the broad
scope of the term "injury" and found no reason that the term
should not embody emotional distress. 126 For these reasons, the
majority concluded that FELA allowed claims for negligent
127
infliction of emotional distress.
Although the right to recover for emotional distress is universally
recognized, no jurisdiction allows for the recovery of all emotional
harms. 28 In recognizing that limitations need to be placed on the
right to recover for this tort, the Court looked to common law tests
for evaluating claims of emotional distress: the "physical impact"
29
test, the "zone of danger" test, and the "relative bystander" test.
Under the physical impact test, to recover for negligent
emotional injury, a plaintiff must prove that he sustained a physical
impact due to the defendant's conduct.13 0 The Court determined
that when Congress enacted FELA in 1908, most industrial states
utilized this test.'3 ' Ninety years later, most states have abandoned
32
the physical impact test.
The majority then considered the "zone of danger" test.1" This
test limits recovery for emotional injury "to those plaintiffs who
sustain a physical impact as a result of a defendant's negligent
conduct, or who are placed in immediate risk of physical harm by
that conduct."1 4 The Court ascertained that fourteen states
currently follow the "zone of danger" test. 35 ,
The final test considered by the majority was the relative
124. Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 544.
125. Id. at 550.
126. Id. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text
127. Id.
128. Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 545.
129. Id. at 545. The policy reasons behind these limiting tests cited by the Court
included: (1) a potential for a flood of trivial claims; (2) no limit to the number of persons
who might suffer emotional trauma as a result of one negligent act; and (3) the incidence
and gravity of emotional injuries are more difficult to evaluate because they hinge on
psychological factors. Id.
130. Id. at 547.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 547.
134. Id. at 547-48. More briefly stated, "those within the zone of danger of physical
impact can recover for fright, and those outside cannot." Id.
135. Id.
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bystander test. 3 6 Under this test, recovery is predicated on whether
the defendant could have reasonably foreseen the emotional injury
to the plaintiff.'3 7 The plurality recognized three significant factors
that determine reasonable foreseeability in such cases: (1) the
proximity of the plaintiff to the scene of the accident; (2) whether
the emotional shock was a result of the plaintiff observing the
accident; and (3) the intimacy of the relationship between victim
and plaintiff.138 The Court acknowledged that nearly half the states
139
have adopted this test in allowing recovery for emotional injury.
After evaluating all three tests, the Court recognized that the
"zone of danger" test is more progressive than either the physical
impact test or the relative bystander test and, therefore, would be
more in harmony with the broad remedial goals of FELA.' 4° The
majority determined that the "zone of danger" test is consistent
with FELAs focus on physical and emotional dangers as well as the
historically liberal FELA jurisprudence.14 ' The Court rejected the
physical impact test because it did not want recovery for emotional
injury to be set aside simply because physical impact did not
occur. 42 The majority disregarded the relative bystander test
because the test limited recovery to persons who witnessed the
injury or death of a close family member.'4 Therefore, the Court
held that although negligent infliction of emotional distress is
cognizable under FELA, emotional distress constitutes an "injury"
under FELA only when it satisfies the "zone of danger" test.'"
After reviewing the Supreme Court's FELA jurisprudence, it is
clear that the Buckley Court has reversed the trend toward
liberalizing FELA interpretation. FELA was enacted to protect
employees of the railroad from the dangerous conditions of the
industry and, for the last fifty years, the Supreme Court has
136. Id. See Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (1968) (rejecting the "zone of danger" test in
favor of a new test that turned on reasonable forseeability, i.e., the "relative bystander" test.)
137. Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 547-48.
138. Id at 548.
139. Id. at 549.
140. Id. at 545.
141. Id. at 556. The Court concluded that the term "injury" as used in FELA refers to
both physical and emotional injuries and that the zone of danger test best provides for both
under any given circumstance. Id.
142. Gottsha/U, 512 U.S. at 556. The physical impact test also has less support under
current common law than does the zone of danger test (only five states continue to use this
test). Id.
143. Id. The Court also pointed out that this test lacks historical support because it
was not developed until 60 years after FELAs enactment. Id.
144. Id. at 555.
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construed FELA liberally to further the goals of Congress.
However, in this case, the Supreme Court has clearly halted that
progress.
Although FELA cases have consistently broadened the instances
in which injured railroad workers can recover, the Buckley Court's
decision has narrowed recovery under FELA by restricting the
types of contact that constitute physical impact under the "zone of
danger" test. The Court concluded that physical impact under the
"zone of danger" test does not include a "simple physical contact
with a substance [in this case, asbestos], that might cause a disease
at a substantially later time, where the substance ... threatens no
harm other than that disease-related risk."1 45 This conclusion is
faulted, erroneous, and destructive to the Court's liberal
interpretation of FELA cases.
The Court's first error was in the classification of Buckley's
exposure to asbestos as a "simple physical contact." As recognized
by the Second Circuit, Buckley's contact with the asbestos-laden
insulation dust was "massive, lengthy and tangible" and took place
one hour per day for three full years.'4 The Court's conclusion also
rejects the analysis in Urie. In Urie, the plurality concluded, "the
mere difference in time required for different acts of negligence to
take effect and disclose their disabling consequences should not
exclude one type of injury from FELA:s coverage." 147 Therefore, the
fact that Buckley is disease-free at this point should have had no
bearing on the Court's decision.
The majority further erred in its justification of this conclusion.
The Court determined that common law precedent does not favor
recovery by those who are disease and symptom-free. However, the
majority seemed to disregard cases that directly support Buckley
because the highest court of the state did not decide them.' 48 The
decision to dismiss these cases is in direct opposition to this
Court's historically liberal treatment of FELA cases by repudiating
the humanitarian goals of FELA and contradicting previous
decisions. The Court in Kernan expressly stated that Congress
145. Buckley, 117 S. Ct. at 2117.
146. Id. at 2116.
147. Urie, 337 U.S. at 187.
148. See Watkins v. Fibreboard Corp., 994 F.2d 253, 259 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that the
jury need not find any current asbestos related disease and may believe that the plaintiff will
never suffer from an asbestos related disease, yet still award damages for the fear of one
day suffering from an asbestos related disease so long as the fears is reasonable in light of
the nature of the exposure). See also In re Moorenovich, 634 F Supp. 634 (D. Me. 1986);
Gerardi v. Nuclear Util. Serv., Inc., 566 N.Y.S.2d. 1002 (Westchester County 1991).
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intended "the creation of no static remedy, but one that would be
developed and enlarged to meet changing conditions and changing
concepts of industry's duty toward its workers."14 9 Furthermore, in
Gottshall, Justice Souter, in his concurrence, concluded that the
Court's duty, in interpreting FELA, is to "develop a federal common
law of negligence under FELA, informed by reference to evolving
common law" so that Congressional intent for liberal recovery by
injured workers could be furthered. 15° This Court's decision to
disregard those cases that support Buckley is in clear opposition to
its previous rulings and the purpose of FELA.
While it is unclear whether the Court's decision will trigger a
movement away from the liberal treatment of FELA, it is evident
that the Buckley decision has sidetracked a fifty-year crusade to
improve industrial safety and hold railroads economically
accountable for their injury-causing negligence. Nonetheless, until
the Supreme Court seizes the opportunity to correct its grave
mistake, those afflicted with emotional distress as a result of
massive asbestos exposure will be unable to recover for their
employers' negligence.
Anthony Lamanna

149.
150.

Kernan, 355 U.S. at 432.
GottshaU, 512 U.S. at 558-59.

